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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE
OF T. MORRIS OSTLER TO ACT AS
A REAL ESTATE BROKER

Case No.

94--0713--CA

Priority- No. 14

PETITIONER'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION
This Petition for judicial review of a final agency action
is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals and said
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals by Utah
Code Annotated, §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues for review in this Petition, and their
accompanying standards of review, are as follows:
1.

Whether or not the Division of Real Estate erred in

finding that Petitioner had induced Gidalthi O. Ojeda D (herein
"Buyer") to request reimbursement of earnest money through
dishonesty.
2.

Whether or not the Division of Real Estate violated

prior practice in revoking Petitioner's real estate license.
The standard of review for findings of fact is set forth in
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16(4)(g).
1

The statute requires that

an agency's findings will be affirmed "only if they are supported
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court." Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n., 858 P.2d
1381, 1385 (Utah 1983); Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Div.,
842 P.2d 887, 890 (Utah 1992); Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n., 842
P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 1992); Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of
Emp. Sec., 863 P.2d 12, 18 (1993), cert, denied, -P.2d- (Utah
1994) .
The standard of review in challenging an agency's action for
being contrary to prior practice is set out in Utah Code
Annotated §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).

The statute requires that the

Court review whether the agency's action is contrary to the
agency's prior practice and whether the inconsistency has a fair
and rational basis. SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Auditing Div., 849
P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993); B.J. Titan Servs. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 822, 831 (Utah 1992); Pickett v. Utah Dep't of
Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statute is dispositive of the issues herein:
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
2

(iii) contrary to the agency's
prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by
giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency;
Utah Code Annotated §63-46b-16 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the revocation of Petitioner's license to
operate as a real estate broker by the Utah Division of Real
Estate.

The Utah Division of Real Estate revoked Petitioner's

license as a result of Petitioner's violation of Utah Code
Annotated §61-2-11.
Appellant alleges that the Divisions revocation of his real
estate license was improper.

The Division's decision to revoke

was based upon a finding that Petitioner had dishonestly induced
a buyer to make statements to Petitioner's former employer that a
closing had not taken place on a particular piece of property,
when in fact it had, in order to recover $500.00.

Appellant

asserts that this finding by the Division was improper and not
properly supported by the record.
In addition, appellant alleges that the decision of the Utah
Division of Real Estate to revoke his license for his violation
of U.C.A. §61-2-11 ran contrary to the previous practice of the
Division in dealing with similar matters.

The Division of Real

Estate's treatment of Petitioner, therefore, was unreasonable,
unfair and prejudicial to Petitioner.

3

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter was initial heard by Administrative Law Judge,
J. Steven Eklund before the Division of Real Estate of the
Department of Commerce of the State of Utah and acted upon by the
Utah Real Estate Commission.

Subsequently, at Petitioner's

request, this matter was subject to an agency review by the
Executive Director of the Utah Department of Commerce of the
State of Utah, Constance B. White.
DISPOSITION BY AGENCY
1.

The Administrative Law Judge held that Petitioner had

admitted to violating U.C.A. §61-2-11(6) by commingling funds of
a seller with his own monies.

The Judge also found that

Petitioner admitted to violating U.C.A. §61-1-11(15) by operating
as a real estate agent while his license was suspended and
receiving a commission while his broker's license was inactive.
Finally, the Administrative Law Judge held that Petitioner
violated U.C.A. §61-2-11(17) by engaging in a dishonest dealing.
More specifically, the Judge found that Petitioner encouraged a
buyer to improperly seek a release of earnest money.

The Judge

recommended that as a result of the afore-mentioned violations
Petitioner's real estate broker license be revoked.

Said

recommendation was confirmed and adopted by the Utah Real Estate
Commission.
Upon request of the Petitioner, the matter was reviewed by
the Utah Department of Commerce.

The Executive Director of the
4

Department, Constance B. White, found that the Division's
decision was based on fact and entered according to law.

The

Division's decision, therefore, was upheld.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant and material facts concerning the background
and Appeal of this matter are as follows:
1.

Petitioner was licensed to practice as a real estate

broker in Utah.
1975.

He was initially licensed as a sales agent in

Petitioner became a licensed broker in October 1987 and he

was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah County from at least
November 198 9 to January 18, 1990.

During that time,

Petitioner's principal broker was Shane Luck.
2.

On November 28, 1989, Petitioner prepared an

earnest money sales agreement, whereby Gidalthi O. Ojeda D
offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and
Alice Skankey.

Petitioner received $500.00 earnest money, which

he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust account.
Skankeys accepted the offer.

The

Help-U-Sell was to be paid a fee

totalling $2,450 on the sale of the home.

Petitioner's

commission, payable from that amount, would total $1,110.00.
3.

Help-U-Sell had full control of the $500.00

earnest money deposited in its trust account and ultimately
delivered the same back to the Skankeys.

The Petitioner tendered

the balance of Help-U-Sell's commission to Help-U-Sell, which
tender was refused.
4.

Petitioner's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was
5

terminated on January 18, 1990.

The Ojeda-Skankey transaction

was not closed as of that date.
5.

Prior to terminating Petitioner's affiliation with

the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if Petitioner had
any transactions which were still pending.

At that time the

Skankey-Ojeda transaction appeared as though it would not close.
This information was given to Mr. Luck.
6.

Petitioner's license was inactivated January 18,

1990 and remained in that status for approximately three (3)
weeks.

The license was then suspended for one (1) year,

effective February 10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by the
Commission (Case No. E89-06-10).
7.

On January 20, 1990 the Skankeys executed a

warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the property to the Ojedas.
On January 22, 1990 an all-inclusive trust deed was executed by
the Ojedas and notarized by the Petitioner.

The Administrative

Law Judge found that the closing occurred on January 22, 1990,
some four days after the Petitioner's license was inactivated.
8.

On or about February 16, 1990, Petitioner tendered

an $840.00 check to Help-U-Sell.

The February 16, 1990 check

represented the selling fee which would have been retained by the
brokerage less the earnest money still on deposit.

By letter,

dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck returned the closing documents
to Petitioner, advised Petitioner that the Skankeys had been
informed Petitioner would have the closing documents and informed
Petitioner that the Skankeys wanted "their closing documents and
6

money immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent
prorations with Ojeda."
9.
transaction.

Help-U-Sell was unwilling to close this
The Skankeys (sellers) and the Ojedas (buyers) were

extremely anxious to cause the sale to go forward.

In the

absence of the sale the Skankeys believed they would be
significantly damaged.

Indeed, Dr. Skankey testified in his

deposition conducted on Friday, June 4, 1993 at page 31, lines 12
through 16:
Q:

So, Dr. Skankey, our question is, is
that if you assume for a minute that the
Ojeda sale didn't take place, and no one
followed through on it, would that have
been harmful to you?

A:

Yes.

10.

The Respondent disbursed all funds due the

Skankeys (sellers) on February 16, 1990.

Mr. Luck

subsequently sent the earnest money deposit to the Skankeys.
11.

Neither the Skankeys nor the Ojedas suffered

any damaged by reason of the Petitioner's action in closing
this transaction.
12.

The Petitioner was motivated to close this

sale as a result of his desire to assist both the Ojedas and
the Skankeys in their desire to complete this transaction.
13.

In light of the determination by the

Administrative Law Judge (J. Steven Eklund) that the closing
occurred on January 22, 1990, four (4) days after the
Petitioner's associate broker's license was inactivated, the
7

Petitioner could have re-activated his own principal
broker's license, prior to the closing date, and completed
this transaction.

The transaction would have been no

different had this license been reactivated, but rather,
would have been consummated in the identical manner it was
in fact consummated.
14.

The only person or entity claiming any damage

in this matter is a claim by Mr. Luck on behalf of Help-USell for lost business.

The broker's portion of the

commission was either controlled by Help-U-Sell (in the form
of the $500.00 Help-U-Sell earnest money deposit) or
tendered to Help-U-Sell (in the form of a check in the
amount of $840.00 delivered by Petitioner to Help-U-Sell).
15.

The recommended order as prepared by the

Administrative Law Judge was that the Petitioner's license
as a real estate broker be revoked.

The Utah Real Estate

Commission confirmed and adopted the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order as prepared by the
Administrative Law Judge.
16.

Petitioner has complied with all

administrative remedies in attempting to rescind the Order.
17.

On November, 28, 1994 Petitioner filed with

the Utah Court of Appeals a request for judicial review of
the Division of Real Estate's decision to revoke his real
estate license.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
8

The Division of Real Estate erred in finding that
Petitioner had engaged in dishonest dealings.

The

Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner implicitly
encouraged Buyer to improperly seek release of earnest money
held by the Help-U-Sell brokerage.

Said finding was

improper inasmuch as it was not supported by substantial
evidence within the record.
The record demonstrates that Petitioner provided the
Buyer with different options as to how to recover the
earnest money from Help-U-Sale.

One of the options

presented by Petitioner was that Buyer could state to HelpU-Sale that the Sale had not closed (it, in fact, had
closed).

This in no way signifies that Petitioner supported

such an approach, nor encouraged it.

Further, any

additional testimony concerning Petitioner's conduct is
hearsay and unreliable.
The Division further erred in its decision to revoke
Petitioner's real estate license since its decision runs
contrary to prior practice of the Division in similar cases.
The Division does not typically revoke a real estate
broker's license for violations similar to those of
Petitioner.

This is particularly true when, as in

Petitioner's case, substantial and numerous mitigating
factors exist.
ARGUMENT
POINT I;

THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED
9

THAT PETITIONER HAD ENGAGED IN AND ENCOURAGED DISHONEST
BEHAVIOR.
The Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact
concluded that, "Respondent...disingenuously and implicitly
encouraged Mr. Ojeda to improperly seek the release of the
earnest monies held by the brokerage." (Ruling, pg. 4 ) .
This finding was improper as it was not supported by the
weight of the evidence contained in the record.

Inasmuch as

the Division's decision to revoke Petitioner's real estate
license was strongly weighted by this conclusion, the Court
should reinstate Petitioner's license.
An order of an administrative agency may be challenged
if the, "agency action is base upon a determination of fact,
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the Court." U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4)(g).

The

record in this matter, therefore, must contain substantial
evidence that Petitioner engaged in dishonest behavior.
Substantial evidence is more than minor comments and
hearsay testimony.

Substantial evidence is, "such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."

Grace Drilling v. Board of Review,

776 P.2d 63 (Ut App. 1989) (quoting Idaho State Ins. Fund v.
Hunicutt, 110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927, 930 (1985).
Substantial evidence is "more than a mere 'scintilla' of
evidence... though 'something less than the weight of the
evidence.'" Id.
10

The Court should consider both the quantity and quality
of the evidence pointing to the finding of facts in question
in order to determine if they can properly be supported.

In

the present case, neither the quantity nor the quality of
the evidence supports a finding by the Administrative Law
Judge that the Petitioner had conducted himself dishonestly.
Evidence, in the record, of Petitioner's alleged
dishonesty is limited to the testimony of two individuals:
1) the Petitioner; and 2) Shane Luck.
Petitioner's testimony regarding his alleged dishonesty
is set forth in the hearing transcript at follows (see
Hearing Transcript pgs. 41-45):
Q.
Now, Mr. Ojeda came to Shane Luck and tried
to collect his $500?
A.
I said: "If you want to have credit for that
in your closing, somebody has got to happen there. And if
in fact we close it through Help-U-Sell, fine, they keep the
$500. If you close at other places, if Help-U-Sale doesn't
close it, frankly, it should go somewhere else. If Help-USell doesn't want anything to do with this transaction, then
it shouldn't come out of their place."
Q.
Sure. But Mr. Ojeda attempted to go to Mr.
Luck to collect the $500 earnest money. Now-A.
That's because I gave him some options. I
said: "You can do this and this and this." And that's one
of the options that he had.
Q.
You told Mr. Ojeda he could go in and try to
collect the $500 from Help-U-Sell?
A.

I said that was an option.

Q.
Well, isn't the only way that he would be
able to collect the $500 is if the deal had in fact not
closed?
A.

Essentially so.
11

Of course, if it had not

closed through Help-U-Sell, he could have collected-supposedly collected that. If Help-U-Sell was going to
close it, then I wanted Help-U-Sell to close it.
Q.
So you told Mr. Ojeda to instruct Mr. Luck
that -- tell Mr. Luck that the deal had not closed, had
failed, and to return the $500 to the Ojedas, right?
A.
Well that was an option, Paul. Like I said,
I said: "You could close it. you don't have t close it.
And you can do what you want. If you are not going to close
it, then you ought to get your $500 back."
Q.
Okay. So you told them to tell Mr. Luck that
the deal had not closed, correct?
A.

Well, at that point, it had not closed.

Q.

The deal had not closed?

A.
The transaction had not closed. When I say
"closing," the closing doesn't take place until its funded.
Q.
But the -- you filled out a trust deed. They
paid you -- they paid a down -- the Ojedas had paid a down
payment, correct ?
A.

They had.

Q.

And you had paid

A.

The money had not been sent, no.
*

sent that money to the

*

*

Q.
So this deal was, in fact, on the railroad
track, if you will?
A.

It was moving towards closure.

Q.

It was moving towards closure?

A*

That's correct.

Q.
yet you told Mr. Ojeda that he could tell the
broker, Shane Luck, that the deal had not closed and -correct?
A.

Well, you ~-

Q.

Let me rephrase it.
12

A.

Okay.

Q.

You told him that he had the option to tell

A.

I can't tell him what to say.

the --

Q.
You told Mr. Ojeda he had the option to tell
Mr. Luck the deal had not closed?
A.
That's correct.
decision there.

I let him make his own

Q.
But you utilized your expertise in these
areas and shared the that expertise with the Ojedas,
correct?
A.
I felt like if he wanted credit for that $500
earnest money then he had to get that credit, whatever he
wanted to do.

Q.
So you utilized your expertise to educate the
Ojedas on how to obtain the $500 that they would then pay
you for the commission, right?
A.
Well, you're trying to structure something
here that isn't quite right. I said, "This is" -- "This is
your options, Mr. Ojeda: If you want to use that for your
credit, that's fine. If you don't, leave it alone.
Shane Luck's testimony regarding Petitioner's alleged
dishonesty is set forth in the trial transcript as follows
(Hearing Transcript, pgs. 68-70):
Q.
Mr. Luck, did one of the Ojedas come into your
office in 19 -- probably, February of 1990.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And did this --

MR. SEILER:
Your Honor, I recognize that the
rules are relaxed, but I would object to the basic hearsay.
It's just to get it on the record.
THE COURT:
ahead Mr. Grant.

That's understood and noted.

13

Go

MR. GRANT:
And did this individual request
that the earnest money agreement - - o r the earnest money
deposit be returned to him?
A.
Q.
to him?

Yes.
And why did He request that the money be returned

A.
He said that the sale had failed. It was not
closing and he wanted his earnest money back.
Q.
Did you have a question -- did you have an
opportunity to question him further regarding this?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And what did you learn from your questioning?

A.
We had an active file and I knew there were
problems with closing it. I did not know that it had closed
at that stage. I pursued that with him and asked him what
was happening. He was quite nervous, and probably 15
minutes into the conversation, he finally said, "Well,
Morris asked me to come and get the earnest money because we
had closed the transaction."
Q.
But he earlier had told you that the deal had, in
fact, not closed?
A.

That's right and he admitted to lying to me.

Q.

He admitted to lying to you?

A.

Yes.

Q.
Did he tell you that Morris had instructed him to
lie to you?
A.
I don't recall at that conversation. I know that
he said to me that Morris asked me to com and get the
earnest money.
Q.
Do you recall if he told you that -- that Morris
instructed you that -- that Morris instructed him to tell
you that the deal had not closed?
A.

That's right, he did say that.

Q.

So then, in fact--

A.

I didn't know it was a lie at that point but he
14

told me that.
Q.
But since the deal had not -- was, in fact, had
closed and since -- and, in fact, that Morris had asked Mr.
Ojeda to tell you that it had failed to close, it was a lie,
right?
A.

I believe (Inaudible), yes.

The Petitioners testimony at the hearing clearly
demonstrates that he made no overt effort to deceive Mr.
Luck or Help-U-Sell.

Petitioner's comments to Mr. Ojeda

were strictly a list of options available to Mr. Ojeda which
he could choose to follow or ignore.

The record makes no

reference that Petitioner gave any instruction to Mr. Ojeda
as to which option was best nor does it suggest Petitioner
encourage him to deceive Mr. Luck or Help-U-Sale.
Included in Petitioner's options was Mr. Ojeda
informing Help-U-Sell the deal had not closed in order to
recover their earnest money.

Petitioner felt this option

was reasonable for a number of reasons.
fact, not been completed.

Also,

The sale had, in

Help-U-Sell, and Mr. Luck,

refused to assist the parties in closing the real estate
transaction.
The testimony of Shane Luck, with regard to
Petitioner's encouragement to Mr. Ojeda to recover the
earnest money by deceit, should be disregarded as it is
entirely based upon hearsay.
Evidence.

Rule 802, Utah Rules of

The testimony of Mr. Luck is untrustworthy

inasmuch as the individual who initially alleged
Petitioner's dishonesty, Mr. Ojeda, did not assert said
15

allegations under oath.

Likewise, Petitioner was not

afforded an opportunity to cross examine Mr. Ojeda with
reference to his allegations.

State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d

198, 310 P.2d 388 (1957) State v. Lory, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah
1986).

The credibility of Mr. Luck's testimony concerning

Petitioners's dishonesty is further diminished by the fact
that Mr. Luck admits that Mr. Ojeda had lied to him
immediately prior to alleging misconduct by Petitioner.
(Hearing Transcript pg. 69) .
The record contains no credible evidence that
Petitioner has requested or encouraged Mr. Ojeda to lie to
Mr. Luck.

The lack of substantial evidence removes the

possibility of the Administrative Law Judge, and
subsequently the division, finding that Petitioner had
engaged in dishonest behavior.
The findings of the Commission, and subsequently the
Department of Commerce, that Petitioner had engaged in
dishonest behavior was the major factor in their decision
revoke Petitioner's real estate broker's license.

In her

Order on Review, the Executive Director of the Department
Commerce concluded as follows:
[T]he Commission made a finding regarding the most
egregious conduct leading to Petitioner's license
revocation, the dishonest dealing resulting from
his inducement of Mr. Ojeda to request
reimbursement of earnest monies through dishonesty
in violation of Utah Code §61-2-11(17). While
Petitioner urges certain facts in mitigation of
his conduct, none of them outweigh the gravity of
this fact. I find the Commission properly
considered all facts mitigating in Petitioner's
16

favor and all aggravating facts weighing against
him. Consequently, the revocation order was based
on fact and entered according to law (Order on
Review pg. 3-4).
The Commission's conclusion that Petitioner had engaged
in dishonest conduct is not supported by substantial
evidence within the record.
Therefore, the Commission's and Department's decision
to revoke Petitioner's real estate brokers license,
primarily as a result of his alleged dishonest behavior, was
without basis.

This Court should, therefore, reinstate

Petitioner's real estate broker's license.
POINT II THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE'S DECISION TO
REVOKE PETITIONER'S REAL ESTATE BROKER'S LICENSE WAS
CONTRARY TO ITS PRIOR PRACTICE IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES.
Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by the
real estate Division's decision to revoke his real estate
license because the Division's decision was inconsistent
with prior decisions with facts and circumstances of a
similar

nature.

This Court is entitled to provide relief

if a petitioner is substantially prejudiced by an agency
action which is "contrary to the agency's prior practice."
U.C.A. §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii).
Petitioner was found in violation of U.C.A. §61-2-11
for closing a real estate transaction while his license was
inactive commingling funds and engaging in dishonest
behavior.

Violations of a similar nature are typically

punished by the Division Real Estate with either a fine, a
17

suspension of a license, or both.

The revocation of

Petitioner's Real Estate Brokers License, therefore, is
excessive and clearly beyond the prior practice of the
division.

See, Pickett v. Utah Dept. of Commerce

858 P.2d

157 (Utah 1993).
The Division of Real Estate's decision to revoke
Petitioner's license is particularly excessive and contrary
to prior practice considering the Divisions's improper
finding that Petitioner had engaged in dishonest conduct.
See, Point I, Supra.

Properly considering only Petitioner's

violations of U.C.A. §§61-2-11(6) and (15) the Division's
decision to revoke Petitioner's license moves even further
beyond the penalties typically ordered by the Division.
This is particularly true considering the numerous
mitigating circumstances in this matter.
The mitigating circumstances of this case augment the
excessiveness of the Division's penalties in comparison to
previous decisions by the Division.

Petitioner's motivation

in closing the real estate transaction was that the buyers
who were from Peru, would have no place to live.
Furthermore, failure to close would have resulted in a
negative cash flow for the Sellers of the property.

In his

testimony, Petitioner stated as follows (hearing Transcript
pgs. 21-22)
Q.
How come you closed this deal after you were no
longer licensed?
A.

Because I felt it was urgent enough to close.
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I

felt -- I felt really bad for both parties, the one that was
anxious to buy, the one was anxious to sell. And, granted,
in retrospect, I would have done it a different way. But it
would have -- it would have hurt the buyers. They would
have not had a place to live. They were in fact planning on
getting moved in and so forth in part of the property. And,
ultimately, it have probably hurt the sellers because it
would have gone and been a detriment cash-wise for them.
The record clearly demonstrates that both buyer and
seller.

Considered the closing on the property as critical.

Neither buyer nor seller suffered any damaged as a result of
any conduct or violation of Petitioner.
Petitioner's assistance in the closing, although
improper, was further prompted by the failure of the
brokerage to close the transaction.

The testimony of both

Petitioner and Shane Luck demonstrates that the brokerage
Help-U-Sell had no intention of closing the deal
notwithstanding it had the $500.00 of earnest money.

While

the forementioned circumstances don't negate Petitioner's
violations of U.C.A. §61-2-11 his motivation in proceeding
with the closing certainly should be considered as
mitigating factors when structuring an appropriate penalty.
Considering the foregoing mitigating circumstances and the
nature of the violations, the Division's decision to revoke
Petitioner's license certainly exceeded customary penalties
ordered by the Division in similar circumstances.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Petitioner
respectfully moves this Court for an Order reversing the
Division of Real Estate's decision that Petitioner had
19

engaged in dishonest behavior.

Petitioner further requests

that this Court find that the Utah Division of Real Estate
exceeded its customary practice in revoking Petitioner's
real estate broker's license considering the facts and
circumstances of this case.
Accordingly, Petitioner respectfully moves this Court
for an Order reinstating Petitioner's real estate brokers
license or, in the alternative, remanding this case back to
the Utah Division of Real Estate for reconsideration in
light of the Court's new findings.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBINSON, SEILER & GLAZIER, LC

THOMAS W./SEILER'
Attorney /tor P e t i t i o n e r
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid, this
24th day of April, 1995:
Lynn Nicholas
Utah Attorney General
Consumer Rights Division
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 8411
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BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the License
of T. Morris Ostler to Act as a
Real Estate Broker

: FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
:
AND RECOMMENDED ORDER
:
RE90-10-01

Appearances:
Thomas W. Seiler for Respondent
Paul M. Grant for the Division of Real Estate
By the Administrative Law Judge:
An April 18, 1994 hearing was conducted in the above-entitled proceeding before J. Steven
Eklund, Administrative Law Judge for the Department of the Commerce. The parties initially
submitted a stipulation of undisputed facts. Therefore, evidence was offered and received.
The Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, now submits the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order for review and action by the Real
Estate Commission and the Director of the Division of Real Estate:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent is presently licensed to practice as a real estate broker in Utah. He was

initially licensed as a sales agent in 1975. Respondent became a licensed broker in October 1987
and he was affiliated with Help-U-Sell of Utah County from at least November 1989 to January 18,
1990. During that time, Respondent's principal broker was Shane Luck.
2.

On November 28, 1989, Respondent prepared an earnest money sales agreement, whereby

Gidalthi O. Ojeda D offered to purchase a Provo, Utah home owned by a Robert and Alice Skankey.
Respondent received $500 earnest money, which he deposited to the Help-U-Sell real estate trust
account The Skankeys accepted the offer. Help-U-Sell was to be paid a fee totalling $2,450 on the
sale of the home. Respondent's commission, payable from that amount, would total $1,110.
3.

Respondent's affiliation with Help-U-Sell was terminated January 18, 1990. The Ojeda-

Skankey transaction had not closed as of that date. Prior to terminating Respondent's affiliation with
the Help-U-Sell brokerage, Mr. Luck inquired if Respondent had any transactions which were still

pending. Respondent stated no outstanding transactions existed. The Ojeda-Skankey transaction was
scheduled to close on or about January 20, 1990.
4.

Respondent's license was inactivated January 18, 1990 and remained in that status for

approximately three (3) weeks. The license was then suspended for one (1) year, effective February
10, 1990, pursuant to an order entered by the Commission (Case No. RE89-06-10). The suspension
was prompted by Respondent's conviction for the possession of a forged document, relative to a real
estate transaction.
5.

On January 20, 1990, the Skankeys executed a warranty deed, whereby they conveyed the

property to the Ojedas. On January 22, 1990, an all-inclusive trust deed was executed by the Ojedas
and notarized by Respondent The parties have stipulated the closing on the transaction occurred
during February 1990. However, both the buyers and sellers statements reflect the taxes and
mortgage interest payments were prorated as of January 22, 1990. Notwithstanding the parties'
stipulation, the more substantial evidence establishes the closing occurred January 22, 1990. When
Respondent closed the transaction, he knew his license was inactive and that the license would be
suspended in the immediate future.
6.

Mr. Luck had informed Respondent not to close the transaction because the Skankeys had

a non-assumable loan on the property and title insurance could not thus be obtained. Mr. Luck
further declined to close the transaction through Help-U-Sell due to the existence of that loan, which
included a due-on-sale clause, and Mr. Luck's belief the Ojedas did not understand the possibility the
loan could be called due on the sale of the property. Moreover, Mr. Luck did not desire to expose
Help-U-Sell to any liability under those circumstances.
7.

Mr. Luck was not aware Respondent had closed the transaction on January 22, 1990.

Respondent received $1,950 at closing as the balance of the selling fee and he deposited those funds
in his own checking account Respondent also received funds payable to the Skankeys and deposited
those monies in his checking account Respondent told Mr. Ojeda that he (the latter) could inform
Mr. Luck the transaction had failed to obtain the $500 earnest money still held in the Help-U-Sell
trust account
8.

Prior to February 16, 1990, Mr. Ojeda contacted Mr. Luck and informed the latter that

the transaction had failed. Mr. Ojeda thus requested the return of the earnest money deposit Mr.
Luck made further inquiry and Mr. Ojeda then admitted the transaction had closed. Mr. Luck
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requested all closing documents be delivered to Help-U-Sell.
9.

On or about February 16, 1990, Respondent tendered an $840 check to Help-U-Sell. The

February 16, 1990 check represented the selling fee which would have been payable to the brokerage
less the earnest money still on deposit By letter, dated February 22, 1990, Mr. Luck returned the
closing documents to Respondent, advised Respondent that the Skankeys had been informed
Respondent would have the closing documents and informed Respondent that the Skankeys wanted
"their closing documents and money immediately" and a "settlement on the January rent prorations
with Ojeda".
10. Mr. Luck also informed Respondent that he assumed Respondent would provide "the
appropriate documents concerning this transaction to the Ojedas". Mr. Luck further stated Help-USell would notify Respondent of "a fee due to us from you for the loss of business to us as a result
of your actions". Based on the advice of legal counsel that the closing should remain Respondent's
responsibility, Help-U-Sell did not accept the February 16, 1990 check. Respondent disbursed the
funds due to the Skankeys on February 16, 1990 and Mr. Luck subsequently sent the earnest money
deposit to the Skankeys. The Ojedas eventually defaulted on their purchase of the property.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Utah Code Ann. Section 61-2-11 provides a civil penalty not to exceed $500 may be imposed
and a real estate license may be placed on probationary status, suspended or revoked if the licensee,
whether acting as an agent or on his own account, is found guilty of:
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any
monies coming into his possession that belong to others, or
commingling those funds with his own, or diverting those funds from
the purpose for which they were received.
(15) violating or disregarding this chapter, an order of the commission or
the rules adopted by the commission and the division;
(17) any other conduct which constitutes dishonest dealing.
Section 61-2-1 provides it is unlawful for any person to act as a principal broker without a
license. Section 61-2-2 further provides a principal broker's license is required to receive valuable
consideration for negotiating or closing a sale of real estate. Moreover, Section 61-2-10 provides it
is unlawful for any associate broker to accept a commission from any person except the principal
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broker with whom he is affiliated and that an inactive licensee is not authorized to conduct real
estate transactions.
Respondent acknowledges he received funds owed to the Skankeys on the closing of the
transaction, he deposited those funds into his personal account and thus commingled those funds with
his own monies. Respondent closed the transaction January 22, 1990, but he failed to remit monies
due to the Skankeys within a reasonable time after the closing of the transaction. Respondent thus
violated Section 61-2-11(6) in both instances.
Respondent also acknowledges he received a commission from the sale of the property when
he was not affiliated with a principal broker and his license was inactive. Respondent paid himself a
sales commission and fees for closing the transaction, although he was not licensed as a principal
broker and was thus not entitled to receive consideration directly from the parties. Further,
Respondent violated the order previously entered by the Commission when he disbursed funds from
the closing of the transaction while his license was suspended by reason of that order. Respondent
thus engaged in multiple instances of misconduct violative of Section 61-2-11(15).
Respondent also suggested Mr. Ojeda erroneously inform Mr. Luck the transaction had closed
as the means whereby Mr. Ojeda might obtain the earnest money held on deposit through the HelpU-Sell brokerage. Respondent thus disingenuously and implicidy encouraged Mr. Ojeda to
improperly seek the release of the earnest monies held by the brokerage. Given the foregoing,
Respondent clearly engaged in dishonest dealing violative of Section 61-2-11(17). A proper factual
and legal basis clearly exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to Respondent's license.
Respondent urges certain mitigating factors should be considered with regard to any
disciplinary action taken on his license. Specifically, Respondent contends the Ojedas and the
Skankeys were highly motivated to close the transaction because the Ojedas would have no place to
live and the Skankeys would incur a negative cash flow if the transacation did not close. Respondent
also asserts neither party suffered any damage because the transaction was closed, the brokerage
unreasonably refused to close the transaction and Respondent merely desired to assist the Ojedas and
the Skankeys as to promote their interests.
The parties to this transaction obviously desired a sale be completed. It is unclear from this
record whether either party suffered any damage by reason of Respondent's unilateral decision to
close the transaction without the knowledge of and participation by his brokerage. There is no

4

sufficient evidence to find and conclude either the Ojedas or the Skankeys did not understand the
significance of the non-assumable loan or the existence of the due-on-sale clause. Respondent may
have been somewhat motivated by his desire to assist both the Ojedas and the Skankeys in their
desire to complete this transaction.
However, various aggravating factors exist as to Respondent's misconduct The Court finds
and concludes Respondent expended substantial efforts to realize the sale of the property, prompt the
closing of this transaction and that he thus anticipated receiving compensation for those efforts.
Significantly, Respondent ignored the consequences of his licensure status as he proceeded to close
the transaction when his license was inactive and later disbursed funds from the transaction while his
license was suspended. The Court is further disturbed by Respondent's characterization of the
suspension of his license as a mere "technicality" which would preclude his ability to close the
transaction. Simply put, Respondent cavalierly continued to act as a broker without any regard for
the fact his license was inactivated and later suspended.
The Court duly acknowledges the Division has received no complaints of any misconduct
undertaken by Respondent during the three years since his license was reinstated. Nevertheless,
Respondent willingly disregarded those statutes which govern his licensure, particularly when
partially influenced by the prospect of financial gain. The Court further finds and concludes
Respondent lacks any genuine acknowledgement of-or significant remorse for-his misconduct To
the contrary, Respondent has basically questioned the reluctance of the brokerage to close the
transaction, minimized his role in Mr. Ojeda's attempt to improperly obtain the earnest money
deposit and characterized his actions as well-intentioned efforts designed to merely promote the
interests of the Ojedas and the Skankeys. The serious nature of Respondent's misconduct, coupled
with his misguided and questionable attitude, compels the conclusion a severe sanction should be
entered as to his license.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license as a real estate broker be revoked.
Dated this

of July, 1994.

linistrative Law Judge

BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the License
of T. Morris Ostler to Practice as a
Real Estate Broker

ORDER
RE90-10-01

The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order is
hereby confirmed and adopted. The real estate broker license of T. Morris Ostler is hereby
revoked, effective August 8, 1994.
Dated this 0>+-U. day of July, 1994.
UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION:

Dak-d Sirnims, Jr. (Ch

udia E. Ashby (Vice Chair)
Claudia

/

jd^Ts^^is
The above Order is confirmed and adopted by the undersigned this
July, 1994.

•7U

<?

Steven H. StewaftTDirector
Division of Real Estate

day of

BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF
T. MORRIS OSTLER TO ACT AS A
REAL ESTATE BROKER

ORDER ON REVIEW
Case No. RE90-10-01

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Executive Director on the request for agency reviewfiledby
T. Morris Ostler ("Petitioner") following the revocation of his license to act as a real estate broker
by the Real Estate Division ("Division"). The Division entered an order revoking Petitionees
license on July 6, 1994, to become effective August 8, 1994. Petitioner originally requested
reconsideration from the Division following entry of the revocation order, and the Attorney
General!s office moved for dismissal of that request. The Division forwarded Petitioner's request
for reconsideration to the executive director for treatment as a request for agency review
Petitioner subsequentlyfileda timely request for agency review with the Department and
requested oral argument. This matter is properly before me as a request for agency review; the
request for oral argument is denied however, because the issues appear to be adequately
developed in the pleadingsfiledherein.
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Section 63-46b-12,
Utah Code Annotated, and Rule R151-46b-13 of the Utah Administrative Code.

ISSUES REVIEWED
Whether the Division, in revoking Petitioner's license, has property interpreted and applied
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions relating to Petitioner's conduct.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Division commenced this proceeding by filing a notice of agency action on

Juiy 23, 1991. A hearing was conducted in this matter on April 18, 1994. On July 6, 1994, the
Division adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Real Estate
Commission ("Commission") following the April hearing and thereby revoked Petitioner real
estate broker's license. Those Findings and Conclusions are adopted for purposes of this review
In addition, Petitioner entered into a stipulation with the Division, by which he expressly admitted
as true certain allegations made by the Division.
2.

In his request for agency review Petitioner contends that the sanction imposed is

too severe under the circumstances. He cites, as mitigating against the sanction imposed, the fact
that Petitioner readily admitted to the Division his error in closing the transaction that gave rise to
the administrative action at a time when his license was inactive, that Petitioner's motivation
regarding the transaction was the protection of the parties to the transaction, and that no
complaints have been received by the Division regarding Petitioner since the petition wasfiledin
1991.
In place of the Division's order of revocation, Petitioner requests a three month suspension
and afineup to $1000, or as an alternative, suspension of the Division's order of revocation for
some probationary period determined by the Commission.
3.

In response, the Division reasserts its position that the severity of the Petitioner's
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misconduct mandates the revocation. It also states that at least one complaint against Petitioner
has been received by the Division since the hearing. I note also that this is the second action
against Petitioner's license . During 1990 and 1991, Petitioner's license had been suspended in
Case No. RE89-06-10.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under Department Rule R151-^6b-13(3) the Division's order is stayed pending

completion agency review.
2.

The conclusions of law adopted by the Division following the April hearing

accurately apply the law to the facts in this case. Utah Code Subsection 61-2-11(6) states that the
Division may revoke the license of a licensee if the licensee is found guilty of:
(6) failing, within a reasonable time, to account for or to remit any monies coming into his
possession that belong to others, or commingling those funds with his own, or diverting
those funds from the purpose for which they were received;
Petitioner admitted violating this provision by commingling funds he received after closing
the Skanky-Ojeda transaction. In addition Petitioner admitted violating Utah Code Section 61-21 (prohibiting unlicensed activity) in closing the Skanky-Ojeda transaction and accepting a sales
commission while his license was inactive.
The Commission made a finding regarding the most egregious conduct leading to
Petitioner's license revocation, the dishonest dealing resulting from his inducement of Mr. Ojeda
to request reimbursement of earnest money through dishonesty, in violation of Utah Code
Subsection 61-2-11(17). While Petitioner urges cenain facts in mitigation of his conduct, none of
them outweigh the gravity of this fact. I find that the Commission properly considered all facts
mitigating in Petitioner's favor and all aggravating facts weighing against him. Consequently, the
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revocation order was based on fact and entered according to law. The Division's order Is
therefore upheld in its entirety.
ORDER
Consistent with the preceding analysis, the Division's revocation of Petitioner's license is
upheld in its entirety. Consistent with Department Rule R15 l-46b-l3(5), the revocation of
Petitioner's license is effective November 23, 1994.

"9!
Dated this W

day of October 1994.

Constance B. White, Executive Director
Department of Commerce
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
Judicial review of this Order may be obtained byfilinga Petition for Review with the
Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. Any Petition for
Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16 Utah Code
Annotated.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I ceniiy that on the £ft

day of October 1994, I caused to be mailed a true and correcr

copy of the foregoing Order on Review, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to:
Thomas W. Seiler
Attorney for Petitioner
80 North 100 East
P.O Box
Provo, Utah 34603-1266
and caused a copy to be hand-deiivered to:
Steven Stewart, Director
Division of Real Estate
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
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